



Proceeding against Stockhllder-Set-off.-Musgrave v. Glen Elder
Farmers' A. Co-o5. S. and P. Ass'n, 48 Pac. Rep. 338 (Kan.). In an
action against a stockholder in a corporation to compel payment of
his stock liability, he may plead as set-off against the, claim of plain-
tiff creditors the indebtedness of the corporation to himself. In
_Afathez v. Neideg, 72 N. Y. ioo, it was said that "the statute liability
creates a fund which belongs to the creditors to secure the payment
of their debts, but it belongs to all the creditors, as well those who
are stockholders as those who are not;" and in Boyd v. Hall, 56 Ga.
563, "The fact that he is a stockholder can make no difference."
Also in Jfarman's Adm'r v. Benton, 79 Mo. i55, it was said, that when
"the trust fund in dispute is handed over entirely to the suing credi-
tor," he "thereby obtains full preference and satisfaction of his de-
mand, thus obtaining the advantage which was denied to the other
creditor, merely because he was a stockholder." See also 2 Beach
on Private Corporations, Sec. 277. Mahan, P. J., dissenting, holds
that it is the policy of the law to create a fund, a right to which the
creditors of the corporation may resort after insolvency, and that
neither the corporation nor its members can destroy or abridge this
right by contract with each other during the actual existence of the
corporation.
Discovery-Examination of Books before Trial-Examination of De-
fendant.-Stern v. Afetroolitan Telep~hone and Telegrahh Co., 46 N. Y.
Supp. i io. Plaintiff alleged in his complaint that he had been a sub-
scriber of defendant telephone company for some period previous to
the time when, on the pretense of putting in a new instrument, de-
fendant attempted to raise the rent of the instrument by a consider-
able sum. Also, inasmuch as defendant's business was affected with
a public use and in essence a monopoly, and a common carrier for
hire of oral and written messages, it was under an implied contract
to furnish its service for a reasonable sum. Defendant's answer put
in issue the charge that the new sum demanded was unlawful, unjust
and illegal, stating that the expenses of operation increased in greater
proportion than the number of subscribers. Defendant did not
attempt to give figures to sustain its contention, and the court held
that under the circumstances plaintiff had a right to demand an
examination of the books and officers of the corporation before the
trial, it being not certain that such examination could be had during
the trial, as the affidavits showed the president and the treasurer to
be non-residents of the State. The court quoted Presbrey v. Public
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O.hinion Co., 6 App. Div. 600, 39 N. Y. Supp. 957, as illustrative of
several decisions denying the accuracy of defendant's statement that
such an examination is never held to be necessary after issue joined,
when it appears that the examination can be had at the trial, except
where fraud is alleged, or some relation of trust confers a present
right to know the facts to be elicited at the trial.
RELATIVE RIGHTS.
Money Lost by Agent-Recovery by Princial.- Thomnpson v. Hfynds et al.,
49 Pac. 293 (Utah). Where a husband has been entrusted with a sum
of money by his wife for the specific purpose of investing it for her
in mining stocks, and has testified that he gambled it away to defend-
ants; held, that he was acting in the capacity of her agent, and she
as principal can recover it back, as the transaction gave defendant
winne.rs no title to the money. Pierson v. Fuhrinann, 27 Pac. io ;
Mason v. Waite, 17 Mass. 560; Keener Quasi Cont., 183, 188, and others
quoted.
Right of Action-Coninelling the .Discharge of a Servant.-Perkins v.
Pendleton, 38 Atlantic Rep. 96 (Me.). A servant has a right of action
against a third person who has unlawfully and by improper means
procured his discharge from an employment and on account of which
he has suffered injury. This is held to be so even though the master
might have'lawfully discharged the servant of his own accord. This
case is somewhat different from Lunley v. Gye, 2 El. and Bl. 2 16, and
Bowen v. Hall, 6 Q. B. Div. 333, and the early American and English
decisions following them. It is held in these cases that the employer
has a right of action against a third person who unlawfully procures
a breach of contract (f service. Perkins v. Pendleton holds there is
no distinction and that the rule applies, both upon principle and
authority, where the employer is induced to break his contract or
where it is broken by the employee.
SuAolort of Child-Liabilio of Father after .Divorce.-Dolloff v. Dol-
loff, 38 Atl. Rep. i9 (N. H.). A divorce procured by the mother with ali-
mony and custody of the child, does not release the father from the
obligation to support the child. Alimony is not maintenance to the
children but to the wife.
MISCELLANEOUS.
Power of Congress-Postal Regulations-Right of Citizen to Use
Mails-Due Process of Law.-oover v. Mk/cChesney, 81 Fed. Rep. 472.
Congress has the right to exclude from the mails such matter as it
may deem injurious to the morals of the people; but it has never yet
been held to have the power to delegate to an executive officer the
power to determine the person or persons who shall be excluded from
the right of sending and receiving mail by the postal system. For an
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executive officer to exclude a citizen from the use of the mail, because,
in that officer's opinion he at some previous time had violated the law
by using the mail in an improper manner by sending unmailable mat-
ter, is an exercise of judicial and not executive authority on the part
of such officer. The use of the mail is a right, and an order of the
Postmaster General which finds complainant guilty of a violation of
the postal laws, and prohibits to him the use of the postal service of
the United States as far as the receiving of mail is concerned, is not
due process of law, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to
the Constitution. See especially Exparte Jackson, 96 U. S. 727; Asso-
ciation v. Zumstein, 67 Fed. iooo; also Dartmouth College Case, 4 Wheat.
518; Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 4 Wheat, 235.
Collision-Liability of City for Negigence of its Fire Tug.-TI wmson
Nay. Co. v. City of Chicago, 79 Fed. Rep. 984. In a libel in per-
sonam against the city of Chicago, growing out of a collision between
the city's fire tug and libelant's propeller, the circumstances were
such that had the tug been owned by private parties, and engaged
in private enterprise, there could be no doubt of their liability for
the injury done. Held, that the city was liable inpersonam. In U.
S. v. The Afalek Adhel, 2 How. 209, Mr. Justice Story made it appa-
rent that the liability of the owner, to the extent of his vessel, for
injuries resulting from negligence or misconduct is not dependent
upon any relation of master and servant, or principal and agent exist-
ing between him and crew, but rests solely upon the fact of owner-
ship. So, although at common law the city is not liable for thc
negligent acts of the fire department, on the ground that the mem-
bers of the fire department are not the servants of the city
in its corporate capacity, yet it is liable in this case for the injury
done by the vessel by virtue of the mere fact of ownership. Where
such liability exists certain political bodies are sometimes exempted,
but solely on the ground of public policy (The Siren, 7 Wall. 152), and
this exemption stops short of city government. The decision in The
Fidelity, x6 Blatchf. 569, Fed. Cas. No. 4,758, is followed in so far as it
maintains that an action in rem cannot lie against the boat, lest its
seizure disarm the city, even temporarily, of its equipment to put
down fires; but is disapproved in its conclusion that the city is also
not liable inpersonam.
Conspiracy-Funeral Directors' Association-Refusal to Sell Goods to
Debtors.-Brewster v. Miller et al., 41 S. W. Rep. 301 (Ky.). In an
action brought to recover damages against a funeral directors' asso-
ciation for refusal of its members to sell goods to plaintiff on the
ground that he was already in debt to one of its members, the fact
that the association was a pool to regulate prices in violation of the
statute (Ky. St. sec. 3915), would give plaintiff no right to action
against it ("Addison on Torts," vol. 2, sec..85o). Nor is an article of the
association directing its members not to sell to one who refuses to
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pay a previous debt to any of its members contrary to the statute,
or an offense at common law (Cooley on Torts, p. 278; Schulter v.
Brewing Co., go Ky. 224, 28 S. W. 5o4). The case is distinguished
from Carew v. Rutherford, io6 Mass. i, mhere a mechanic, under the
necessity of employing workmen, was held to have been compelled
by duress to pay a sum of money which he was under no legal obliga-
tion to pay, in consequence of a conspiracy which induced the work-
men to leave his employ. In the present case, even if the particular
article was intended to force plaintiff to pay a debt which he did not
owe, still no cause of action existed, as he did not pay the sum
demanded.
RiParian Rights-Reshective Rights of Owner and Public.-Pollock v.
Cleveland Ship-building Co., 47 N. E. Rep. 582 (O.). The defendant, a
shipbuilding company, in arranging derricks to repair vessels, carried
lines in front of and across a portion of the plaintiff's river bank and
tied them to posts and piles driven upon its own land. Held, in an
action of trespass, that the public is entitled to moor vessels for the pur-
pose of repairs, putting in machinery, etc., opposite the land of a
riparian proprietor, but that such right does not extend to the use of
lands not covered by water.
